


Defection of Soviet Spy Is Exploited in U.S.

PERSONENBESCHREIBUNG	
DESCRIPTION	
SIGNALMENT	
Nachname	Kaufmann
Vorname	Dietrich / Golp
Geburtsdatum	02. März 1928
Geburtsort	Buchschlag
Religion	evangelisch
Größe	175 cm
Haarfarbe	braun
Augenfarbe	blau
Blutgruppe	keine
	
Unterschrift des Passinhabers Signature of bearer Signature du titulaire	
Es wird hiermit bescheinigt, daß der Passinhaber die im Lichtbild dargestellte Person ist und die Unterschrift darunter eigenhändig vollzogen hat. It is hereby certified that the bearer is identical with the person in the photograph and that the signature has been given in his own hand. Il est certifié que le titulaire est la personne représentée par la photographie et que la signature est donnée par lui-même.	
Berlin, den 24. Jan. 1967 J. M. Auftrag Unterschrift / Signature / Signature	
C 0034822	

A West German passport issued Jan. 24, 1967, to Lieut. Col. Yevgeny V. Runge under the name of Willi Gast

Intelligence Circles Use Case In Fight Against Soft Line

By BENJAMIN WELLES
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 9—The defection of Lieut. Col. Yevgeny Y. Runge, a 39-year-old Soviet intelligence officer, is regarded as a windfall by United States intelligence officials.

They are utilizing the case to pursue a threefold objective: to expose what they consider a new emphasis on the uses of "illegal" agents in Soviet espionage, to promote closer cooperation among Western security services and to counteract what they con-

sider the tendency of some American officials, intent on "building bridges" to the Soviet Union, to minimize Soviet espionage practices.

Colonel Runge, an ethnic German from the Ukraine, defected last month. He took with him his wife, Valentina, and their 7-year-old son, Andrei, after having posed 11 years as a vending-machine dealer in West Germany as a cover for his espionage activities.

As a result of his defection, five of his subordinates have been apprehended in West Germany. The information he supplied led to the apprehension or surveillance of at least 20 more agents, and the trail may eventually lead to the United States.

Intelligence officers here and in Western Europe regard the Runge case as unique because they say, the spy's disclosures have so incriminated his subordinates that they are talking freely. In other cases it was the subordinates who first defected and then exposed senior officers such as Col. Rudolf I. Abel, who was arrested in New York in 1957, and Gordon A. Lonsdale, who spied in Britain.

These two maintained a tight-lipped silence during


years of imprisonment until they were exchanged for Western agents held in the Soviet Union.

Equally significant is the intimate glimpse that Colonel Runge's defection provides into the warfare waged between the Soviet and American espionage establishments. Most defectors are kept hidden by the Central Intelligence Agency for months, even years, while they provide information. After all the information possible has been gleaned, the defector is allowed to resettle with a new name and identity.

But Colonel Runge, almost from the start, was involved in the incessant global rivalry between the Soviet and United States intelligence services, some of it covert, some open to view.

Fortunately for the C.I.A., his defection coincided with a

Original filed in ORG 1- KGB



Organizational chart of the State Security Committee of the Soviet Union, which employs 600,000 to one million people. The First Chief Directorate for Foreign Intelligence, left, is comparable to the Central Intelligence Agency.

Structure of Soviet Intelligence Unit Is Outlined

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 9—The Soviet Union's State Security Committee, which is the nation's principal intelligence agency, employs 600,000 to one million people inside and outside the Soviet Union, according to Western estimates.

Only one of its divisions, the First Chief Directorate for Foreign Intelligence, is comparable in function to the Central Intelligence Agency. This division was the one in charge of Lieut. Col. Yevgeny Y. Runge, an agent who recently defected to the United States.

Other functions handled by the Soviet State Security Committee have their equivalents in the United States in the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the National Security Agency, the Secret Service, the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the Bureau of Customs.

Thus the Soviet agency is also concerned with internal security and subversive activity. When it finds it necessary, it observes Soviet citizens and foreign residents at their places of work and in their private activities.



Anatoly I. Lazarev



Yuri V. Andropov

The agency cracks codes and communications used by other governments, provides bodyguards for high political figures and manages technical laboratories to devise new equipment for intelligence and other purposes. The 200,000 border guards also fall under the control of the security apparatus.

A Museum in Moscow

The organization has its own museum in Moscow, displaying mementoes of past security exploits. The exhibits include the parachute used by the American U-2 pilot, Francis Gary Powers, shot down over the Soviet Union in 1960. The museum is not open to the public.

The agency prints its own house organ, called Chekistsky Sbornik. The magazine has a select and limited circulation. The present name of the State Security Committee, known in Russian as K. G. B. for Komitet Gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti, dates from 1954. It is the successor organization to the security apparatus started by Lenin as the Cheka, then reorganized periodically under different names, represented by the initials G.P.U., N.K.V.D., and M.V.D.

Its officers still refer to themselves as Chekists, a term both fearful and glamorous in the Russian context.

At times in Soviet history the security police have played a powerful role in the nation's politics, notably in the era from 1938 to 1953 when Lavrenti P. Beria headed the apparatus and served as one of Stalin's closest associates.

Beria was executed within months of Stalin's death, and the post-Stalin leaders have shown marked concern about letting the security apparatus ever play the dominant role in policy-making that it achieved earlier.